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DISCRIMINATION AS A SWORD FOR
THE POOR: USE OF AN "EFFECTS TEST"
IN PUBLIC UTILITY LITIGATION
ROGER D. COLTON*
It is a testament to our maturing concept of equality that... we
now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness
can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and public interest
as the perversity of a willful scheme.1
One of the established rules in public utility regulation today is that
rates and services are to be offered on a "non-discriminatory" basis.2
Unfortunately, regulators and ratepayers often use the claim of "dis-
crimination" only as a shield to stop income-based programs designed
to protect the poor.' Moreover, the claim of "discrimination" has
often been confined to "rates" -it is defined as "cost-based" in this
context4- while discrimination in the provision of service has been
* B.A., 1975, Iowa State University; J.D., 1981, University of Florida. Colton is an
attorney with the National Consumer Law Center in Boston, Massachusetts.
Legal Services Corporation funds were not used in the preparation of this article.
1. Hansen v. Hobson, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967).
2. A. PRIEST, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 285 (1969) ("Preven-
tion of discrimination has been a vital regulatory function since federal and state stat-
utes which deal with 'natural monopolies' first acquired teeth. In fact, rebates,
preferential charges and service inequalities were largely responsible for such legislative
dentures.").
3. See generally Colton and Sheehan, "A New Basis for Conservation Programs for
the Poor: Expanding the Concept of A voided Costs," 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 135, 137
(1987) (discussing proposed conservation program justified on an avoided cost basis).
4. For discussion of cost-based discrimination, see infra notes 52-57 and accompa-
nying text.
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largely ignored.5 Each of these trends should be reversed.
The anti-discrimination directive can be used as a sword in the pub-
lic utility arena to protect low-income interests. Anti-discrimination
regulations should be applied particularly in the evaluation of the "ser-
vice" practices of public utilities.6 State utility statutes should be con-
strued not only to proscribe overt discrimination in rates but also to
proscribe more subtle forms of discrimination, inadvertent or other-
wise, in the areas of disconnections, deposits, payment plans, late
charges and the like.7 The presence of discrimination in these areas
should be determined using an "effects test."8 Given the success of
similar reasoning regarding employment,9 housing l° and consumer
credit," the failure to do so with regard to utilities seems
inexplicable. 12
This article looks at how the "effects test" might be applied in the
utility area. Part I discusses the definition and application of the prohi-
bition against "discrimination" in utility cases. Part II examines the
use of an "effects test" in the non-utility context. Part III describes
how such an analysis can be used in seeking to prove utility discrimina-
5. See generally E. NICHOLS, PUBLIC UTILITY SERVICE AND DISCRIMINATION
(1928).
6. "When a utility fails to provide equal treatment for those similarly situated, it
should receive attention. Regulatory shoes should remain pointed for that express pur-
pose. Their vigorous use plainly will be in the best interests of regulators and regulated
alike." PRIEST, supra note 2, at 326. See also Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties
of Public Service Companies, 11 COLUM. L. REV. 514, 531 (1911) (discussing why pub-
lic service companies are subject to peculiar rules of law).
7. See, e.g., Hicks v. Monroe Util. Comm'n, 108 So. 2d 127 (La. Ct. App. 1958) (no
difference between refusing to serve and fixing of discriminatory rate).
8. See, e-g., Hsia, The Effects Test: New Directions, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 777
(1977). Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 128 (1976); Note, Credit Scoring and the ECOA: Applying the
Effects Test, 88 YALE L.J. 1450 (1979).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970) [hereinafter Title VII]. Congress enacted
Title VII in 1964. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-359, 78 Stat. 296. Title
VII was amended extensively in 1972. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1970) [hereafter Title VIII].
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691(f) (1976) (popularly known as the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act or ECOA).
12. See Hsia, supra note 8, at 802-03. "As a statutory standard, the effects test
continues to expand its scope. It began as a test for scrutinizing employment discrimi-
nation but [there] is no reason to preclude its use to interpret other antidiscrimination
statutes. In fact, it can persuasively be contended that the effects test is evolving into a
generally applicable standard for testing discrimination." Id.
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tion. Part IV provides illustrative uses of an "effects test" in customer
service situations and reviews one particular case to determine if appli-
cation of this test might have given rise to different results.
I. "DISCRIMINATION" IN THE UTILITY CONTEXT
Most states have codified a prohibition against "unjust" or "unrea-
sonable" discrimination in the rendition of utility service.1 3 Those ju-
risdictions that do not have statutes setting forth such a proscription
have judicially incorporated the prohibition.4 Not all discrimination
is banned, however. Rather, only "unreasonable" differences and "un-
due" preferences fall afoul of the limitation."
Traditional discrimination analysis can be applied in new ways to
protect vulnerable low-income populations. No alteration in the na-
ture of the doctrine need be made, simply a change in its application.
Rather than looking only at discriminatory preferences, commissions
should look also at discriminatory burdens. Rather than examining
only discriminatory rate structures, commissions should examine also
discriminatory service regulations. Rather than studying only inten-
tional discrimination, commissions should study also de facto
discrimination.
A. The Historical Development of the Doctrine of Discrimination
The genesis of the proscription on discrimination lies in the utility's
common law duty to serve. 16 Dating back to medieval times, 7 the
13. See, eg., IND. STAT. ANN. § 8-1-2-103 (1988); N.C. GENERAL STAT. § 62-110
(1988).
14. See, eg., State ex rel. Guste v. Council of City of New Orleans, 309 So. 2d 290,
295 (La. 1975).
15. See, e.g., Re Delaware Power & Light Co., 56 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 1 (Del.
P.S.C. 1964) (unlawful activities of an electric utility); City of St. Charles v. Illinois
Commerce Comm'n, 21 111. 2d 259, 172 N.E.2d 353 (1961) (rates discriminated unrea-
sonably against small customers); Re Utah Power and Light Co., 27 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 334 (Utah P.S.C. 1978) (senior citizen rates and discrimination); American
Hoechest Corp. v. Department of Pub. Util., 399 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Mass. 1980) (experimen-
tal rates for elderly not unduly discriminatory).
16. See Burdick, supra note 6, at 515. "The features which at common law distin-
guished those engaged in public or common callings (the original public service compa-
nies) from those who were not so engaged, were the peculiar general duties laid upon
the persons engaged in common callings to serve all applicants for their services, and to
perform such services with care without a special assumpsit to that effect. To these
primary duties there are certain corollaries, namely, that the service must be reasonably
adequate and rendered upon reasonable terms, and that it must be impartial." Id.
1990]
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common law predicated the obligation to provide non-discriminatory
rates and services on three grounds. 8 First, the monopolistic charac-
ter of the services was considered important. 9 Whether it was a fer-
rier, common carrier, or an innkeeper,20 the common law recognized
that consumers had no choice among vendors and that a law was
needed to stand between the provider of services and the abuse that
unfettered monopoly power might portend.2' Second, the common
law recognized an implicit agreement in a general assumpsit in the
"holding out" to serve the general public.22 This "holding out" was
the factor that created a quasi-contract with the public to serve all who
came on just and reasonable terms and on equal terms.23
A third line of reasoning held that acceptance of public benefits re-
17. See B. WYMAN, THE SPECIAL LAW GOVERNING PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 1-42 (1911) "[T]here is to be found from earliest times a peculiar law gov-
erning conduct of those engaged in a public employment." Id. at 5.
18. See generally R. TUGWELL, THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF PUBLIC INTEREST
(1922).
19. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (the government may regulate the man-
ner in which each uses personal property if such regulation is in the public good). But
see Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U.S. 391 (1894) (regulating grain elevators only applies
to public use elevators); Budd v. N.Y., 143 U.S. 517 (1891) (owner of elevator guilty of
exacting charge in excess of statutory rates). See generally, Wyman, The Law of the
Public Calling as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 217 (1904) (prob-
lem of monopolies). But see Adler, Business Jurisprudence, 28 HARV. L. REV. 135
(1914).
For a superb critique of the "monopoly theory," see Rottschaefer, The Field of Gov-
ernmental Price Control, 35 YALE L.J. 438, 451-56 (1926).
20. Wyman, supra note 17, at 17. "Barber, surgeon, smith and tailor are no longer
in common calling because the situation in modern times does not demand it; but inn-
keepers, ferrymen, carriers and wharfinders are still in that classification since even in
modern business the conditions required them to be so treated." Id.
21. Id. at 3. "In the early part of the nineteenth century, free competition became
the very basis of the social organization, with the consequence that the recognition of
public callings as a class almost ceased. It is only in very recent years that it has again
come to be recognized that the process of free competition fails in some cases to secure
the public good; and it has again come to be reluctantly admitted that State control is
again necessary over such lines of industry as are affected with a public interest." Id.
22. Burdick, supra note 6, at 515. "It would seem that the origin and basis of the
liability of the person engaged in a common calling for failure to serve or for lack of care
in the performance of the service, is to be found in the early developed branch of the
action on the case." Id.
23. Id. at 515-16. "It was because a person held himself out to serve the public
generally, making that his business and in so doing assumed to serve all members of the
public who would apply... that he was liable in action on the case for refusal to serve
... by which refusal or lack of care he committed a breach of assumpsit." Id.
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quired recipients to serve all who came on equal terms.2 4 While the
acceptance did not by its terms mandate such activity by the recipient,
it necessarily implied it. According to the reasoning, public funds in
particular, and government largess in general would not be provided to
an institution that unreasonably excluded some part of the populace.
In Re Harrison Rural Electrification Association,2 5 for example, the
West Virginia utility commission relied on the fact that Rural Electrifi-
cation Association (REA) funds were statutorily to be used "for rural
electrification.. .[and] the furnishing of electric energy to persons in
rural areas who are not receiving central station service.",2 6 The com-
mission held that the statute meant "all" persons, for Congress could
not have intended that public monies be advanced for the benefit of a
particular class of persons within an area and denied to others within
the area who were willing and able to receive it.27 A rural electrifica-
tion cooperative's acceptance of REA funds thus would be an acknowl-
edgment that the co-op is a "public utility."2 8
At least one commentator, however, has concluded that the ban on
discrimination postdates the common law duty to serve. 29 According
to this commentator, the duty of non-discrimination by a public utility
was of statutory origin that did not arise until after the advent of regu-
latory commissions.3 0 In this regard, the cases are inconsistent.3" In
24. See Messenger v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 36 N.J.L. 407 (1873). "A company of
this kind is invested with important prerogative franchises among which are the rights
to build and use a railway, and to charge and take tolls and fares. These prerogatives
are grants from the government, and public utility is the consideration for them. [If]
they had remained under the control of the state, it could not be pretended, that in the
exercise of them, it would have been legitimate to favor one citizen at the expense of
another. [And] it seems to me impossible to concede, that when such rights as these are
handed over, on public considerations, to a company of individuals, such rights lose
their essential characteristics. [In] the use of such franchises, all citizens have an equal
interest and equal rights, and all must, under the same circumstances, be treated alike."
Id. at 413.
25. 24 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) 7 (W.Va. 1938).
26. Id. at 12 (citing Rural Electrification Act chap. 432, 7 U.S.C. Ch. 31, §§ 902,
904).
27. Harrison, 24 Pub. Util. Rep. (PUR) at 12-13.
28. It was not the acceptance of REA funds, itself, that conferred public utility
status. Rather, the acceptance of REA funds was evidentiary. Acceptance was an ac-
knowledgement that the co-op holds itself out to serve the general public. It is this
holding out that is the attribute of a public utility.
29. See generally R.K. DAVIDSON, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN THE SELLING OF
GAS AND ELECTRICITY (1955).
30. Id. at 30.
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Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,32 the
United States Supreme Court said that the common law "demanded
little more than that [railroads] should carry for all persons who ap-
plied, in the order in which the goods were delivered at the particular
station, and that their charges for transportation should be reason-
able."33 The Court noted, "[it was even doubted whether they were
bound to make the same charge to all persons for the same service."34
In contrast, in Messenger v. Pennsylvania Railroad," the New Jersey
Supreme Court held:
A person having a public duty to discharge is undoubtedly bound
to exercise such office for the equal benefit of all, and, therefore, to
permit the common carrier to charge various prices, according to
the person with whom he deals, for the same services, is to forget
that he owes a duty to the community.36
The United States Supreme Court has suggested that the grant of spe-
cial privileges is a factor upon which a duty of non-discrimination can
be found.37
Under whatever common law theory, or under specific statutory di-
rectives, there is a clear obligation today to provide non-discriminatory
rates and service. Having established the underlying purposes and pol-
icies which support that notion, it is necessary to examine precisely
what must be shown in order to prove the existence of
discrimination.38
31. Burdick, supra note 6, at 529. The author, in a turn of the century article,
stated: "The doctrine that patrons of public service companies are entitled to similar
rates for similar services is probably not to be found in any except recent cases. Until
late years, it was not suggested that a man had any ground for complaint if a public
service company charge him a rate reasonable per se, though another patron were
charged less for similar service. And when such a suggestion was made courts took
different views to what the common law was on the subject." (citations omitted).
32. 145 U.S. 263 (1892).
33. d at 275.
34. Id. (citations omitted). The Court said further, however, that the "weight of
authority in this country was in favor of an equality of charges to all persons for similar
services." Id at 276.
35. 36 N.J.L. 407 (1873).
36. Id at 410.
37. See, e.g., Wolf Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations of Kansas, 262 U.S.
522, 535 (1923) (imposing duties of government regulation on those businesses that
provide public services).
38. Only cases that have found discrimination to exist are reviewed herein. Well-
reasoned and persuasive cases exist finding that discrimination either does not exist, or
is justifiable. For an excellent review of whether lifeline rates are discriminatory, see
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol37/iss1/3
DISCRIMINATION AS A SWORD FOR THE POOR
B. The Necessary Elements
For a rate or service to be discriminatory, it must have two essential
elements: (1) a benefit or preference to a discrete class of customers
and a harm to or burden upon a different class arising as a direct result
or a burden or duty uniquely imposed upon a particular class; and (2) a
lack of any utility-related basis for making the distinction at issue.
Historically, an analysis of the discriminatory effects of a utility's
actions usually has sought to determine whether a utility has granted
an undue preference to a particular class of customers. Such cases
have examined an expressly articulated purpose to provide an extra
benefit to a discernible class. The cases studying special rates for the
poor are illustrative.39 Special rates for the poor have been considered
for electricity," ° natural gas 4 1 telephone,42 and transit43 services. This
preference, when designed to benefit needy persons, has generally taken
one of three forms. First, proposals to exempt the poor and the elderly
Taubman and Rauch, Recent Decisions on Rate Structure Reform: A Survey With Em-
phasis on Lifeline Rates, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 607 (1976).
39. See generally Annotation, Public Utilities: Validity of Preferential Rates for Eld-
erly or Low-Income Persons, 29 A.L.R. 4th 615 (1984) (annotation weighs rate structure
considerations against objections that rate structures unfairly prefer elderly or low in-
come persons).
40. See, e.g., Re Generic Hearings Concerning Elec. Rate Structure, 36 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 6 (Colo. P.U.C. 1979) (comprehensive investigation of all elements of
retail electric rate design); Re Rate Design for Elec. Corps., 26 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th
(PUR) 280 (N.Y. P.S.C. 1978) (determining relevance of lifeline concept for electric
rate structure); Re Potomac Elee. Power Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep. 3rd (PUR) 250 (D.C.
P.S.C. 1970) (rate determination proceeding); American Hoechest Corp. v. Massachu-
setts Dept. of Pub. Utils., 399 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 1980); Re Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y., 85 Pub. Util. Rep. 3rd (PUR) 516 (R.I. P.U.C. 1978) (rate determination pro-
ceeding); Re Central Vt. Pub. Serv. Corp., 7 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 67 (Vt. P.S.B.
1974) (application for rate increase).
41. See, eg., Washington Gas Light Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 450 A.2d 1187
(D.C.App. 1982) (affirming rate determination); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Pub-
lic Util. Comm'n of Colo., 590 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1979) (suit challenging establishment of
reduced rates for low income elderly and disabled persons).
42. See eg., Re Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 7 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 55
(Ala. P.S.C. 1954) (consideration of telephone rates and services based on income level);
Colorado Mun. League v. Public Util. Comm'n of Colo., 591 P.2d 577 (Colo. 1979)
(rate determination); Re New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 84 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR)
130 (Mass. D.P.U. 1970) (investigation of rate schedules); Re New England Tel. and
Tel. Co., 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 417 (R.I. P.U.C. 1971) (feasibility determination
for economy rates).
43. See, e.g., Louisville Transit Co., 82 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 1 (KY P.S.C.
1969) (rate determination).
1990]
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from proposed rate increases have been suggested." In this instance,
rates for the specified class were proposed to stay constant, with in-
creased costs passed on to remaining consumers. Second, an explicit
per unit discount has been offered.45 In these instances, classes such as
the poor and the elderly would pay only a portion of their "full" cost of
service.46 Finally, a reduced rate on an initial block of energy has been
offered, with subsequent blocks priced at higher rates.47 The justifica-
tion for this preference was that such discounts provided an affordable
initial amount of energy for basic needs.
In most instances, the preferences were justified strictly on social
welfare grounds.48 In these situations, regulators disapproving such
proposals acknowledged the need49 but denied any responsibility in re-
sponding to the need.50 Typical of the response was a finding of the
44. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n,
687 P.2d 92 (N.M. 1984) (telephone discount rate program).
45. See, e.g., Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 Pub.
Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 87 (Or. P.U.C. 1984) (based on age or income).
46. It is important to note, however, the circular logic of this statement. To say that
rates are not "cost-based," or fail to cover the "full costs," does not acknowledge that
"cost" can be defined in many different ways. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found.
v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1056 (Utah 1981) ("Thus, depending on
the method adopted by the Commission for allocating costs, some low usage customers
could properly be burdened with something less than all of a rate increase attributable
to new plant and equipment, based on traditional rate making concepts"). See also
Comment, Lifeline Electric Rates: Are They Unreasonably Discriminatory, 83 DICK. L.
REv. 541 (1979) (examining justifications for lifeline rates); Taubman and Frieden,
Electricity Rate Structures: History and Implications for the Poor, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 431 (1976) (discusses mechanisms available to alleviate impact of rate increases on
fixedAow income persons).
47. See, eg., Re Lifeline Rates, 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 163, 165 (Ariz. Corp.
Comm'n 1982); Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 401 (N.H.
P.U.C. 1972) (initial low-cost block to poor persons). See also Mountain States Legal
Found. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047, 1055-57 (Utah 1981).
48. For other grounds, see infra note 55 and accompanying text.
49. See, eg., Re Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 95 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) at 448.
("It is evident that low-income people are finding it increasingly difficult to pay for basic
electric service. Basic services such as electricity are essential to health and an accepta-
ble standard of living in this country, and no person should be compelled by economic
circumstances to which he may be subjected through no fault of his own, to be without
such a service.") Id.
50. See e.g., Id. ("It is a fundamental premise today that persons unable to provide
food and shelter for themselves should be helped by a compassionate and relatively
affluent society. However, such utility service for low-income persons should probably
be subsidized by the taxpayers at large rather than indirectly by other ratepayers of the
company."). See also Washington Gas Light Co., 450 A.2d at 1203.
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Colorado Supreme Court, which held that although the discount rate
"benefits an unquestionably deserving group, the low-income elderly
and low-income disabled,... [t]his unfortunately does not make the rate
less preferential."51
The fundamental principle articulated by courts and commissions
disapproving preferential proposals for low-income households as dis-
criminatory is that rates must be cost-based. 2 This articulation ap-
pears simply to be the standard way to indicate that households which
are similarly situated must be treated alike.5 3 In many instances, no
claim of a utility-related basis for the discount was advanced. 54 In
other instances, claims of a cost difference between the benefitted class
and others were noted." Such an argument, however, is not always
accepted. For example, the argument that seniors impose less of a cost
on an electric system was rejected as unsupported.56 Also rejected was
an argument that low-income customers were cheaper to serve.5 7
51. Mountain States Legal Found., 590 P.2d at 498.
52. See Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 87 (Or. P.U.C. 1984). "The court-required distinctions between cus-
tomers' rates are to be justified by meaningful differences in the service provided by the
utility to each customer class, especially the cost of that service. [If] the material billing
factors are different, a classification based upon such differences is satisfactory. These
factors may include the quantity used, the time of use, the manner of use, or any other
factor related to the cost of furnishing that service." Id. at 91 (quoting Kliks v. Dalles
City, 335 P.2d 366 (Or.1959)). See also, eg., North Carolina ex rel. N.C. Util. Comm'n
v. Mun. Corp. of Scotland Neck, 90 S.E.2d 519 (N.C. 1959); City of Cleveland v. Pub.
Utils. Comm'n of Ohio, 406 N.E.2d 1370 (Ohio 1980); United States Steel Corp. v.
Pennsylvania, 390 A.2d 849 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1978).
53. See, eg., Citizen Action Coalition of Ind., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 450
N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983) ("The State prohibits charging different rates for
'like and contemporaneous service.' A targeted lifeline rate structure does precisely
that. It charges customers receiving the same service under the same circumstances
different rates.").
54. See generally Mountain States Legal Found., 636 P.2d 1047 at 1055-57 (citing
recent case law indicating that the basis for disputes is not on a utility-related basis but
basis of age and income of residential customers).
55. See, eg., Boston Edison Company v. Department of Pub. Utils., 375 N.E.2d 305
(Mass. 1978); Re Consumers Power Co., 25 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 167, 232, 238
(Mich. 1978).
56. E.g., Mountain States Legal Found., 636 P.2d at 1058; Consolidated Edison Co.,
85 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 276, 297 (N.Y. P.S.C. 1970).
57. E.g., Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 Pub. Util.
Rep. 4th (PUR) 87, 89 (Or. P.S.C. 1976). But see, Boston Edison Co. v. Dept. of Pub.
Utils., 375 N.E.2d 305, 333 (Mass 1978) (low-use customers did not cause increased
rates and could be exempt from rate hike).
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In each of these instances, the grant of the preference was found to
be to the substantial detriment of the remaining ratepayers. In Greater
Birmingham Unemployment Committee v. Alabama Gas Corp.," for
example, an income-based rate was found to impose an annual $50 cost
on remaining ratepayers,5 9 a burden deemed unacceptable.' In Ore-
gon, the public utility commissioner found that a proposed discount
would "require nonpoor customers to provide millions of dollars each
year in increased rates."61 In New York, the annual cost simply to
reduce the basic service charge to senior citizens from $2.40 to $1.70
per month was $2 million.62 Not only the cost of the discount, but the
costs of administration, such as determining eligibility, have been con-
sidered as well.63 Additionally, the imposition of a cost, or an adverse
effect, on ratepayers not in the benefitted class has been held to be an
essential element of a "discriminatory" rate."
Several subsidiary principles regarding utility-related bases for dis-
tinctions flow from this general concept. First, non-utility characteris-
tics, such as low-income status, are irrelevant.65 Characteristics that
are not rationally related to the service itself will not support distinc-
tions. 66  Second, the over-inclusive and under-inclusive characteris-
tics 67 of proposals lead to disapproval.68  For example, in Citizen
58. 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 218 (Ala. P.S.C. 1987).
59. Id at 227.
60. Id "A plan which imposes costs of this magnitude on non-participating rate-
payers is, in our opinion, unduly discriminatory and unjustly preferential."
61. Re Rate Concessions to Poor Persons and Senior Citizens, 14 Pub. Util. Rep.
4th (PUR) 87, 89 (Or. P.U.C. 1976).
62. Re Consolidated Edison Co., 85 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 276, 296 (N.Y.
P.S.C. 1970).
63. E.g., Re New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 89 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 417, 423-
24 (R.I. P.U.C. 1971); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 91
Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 321 (Pa. P.U.C. 1971).
64. E.g., Re Investigation of Airline Rates, 53 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 643 (Ca.
P.U.C. 1964); Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pennsylvania R.R., 42 Pub. Util.
Rep. 3d (PUR) 166 (Pa. 1962).
65. According to the Colorado supreme court, "the PUC's power to effect social
policy is restricted by statute no matter how deserving the group benefitting from the
preferential rate may be." Mountain States Legal Found. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Colo., 590 P.2d 495, 498 (Colo. 1979).
66. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Utah Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 636 P.2d 1047,
1052-53 (Utah 1981) ("Classification of customers must necessarily be accomplished by
reference to general characteristics having some rational nexus with the criteria used for
determining just and reasonable rates.").
67. See, eg., Re Lifeline Rates, 46 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 149, 156 (Ind. P.S.C.
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Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc. v. Public Service Company of Indi-
ana,69 the appellate court held that "if low-income customers use low
amounts of electricity and high-income customers use large amounts of
electricity, a general lifeline rate structure would be an equitable
method of providing assistance to the needy.",70 The court noted, how-
ever, that the commission had found that a "positive, but only moder-
ate, correlation exists between level of income and consumption of
electricity., 71 The court then found dispositive the commission's con-
clusion that "although a general lifeline rate structure would benefit
low-income consumers who are low users of electricity, it would have
the undesirable effect of benefitting many middle and high-income con-
sumers who are low users of electricity and harming a number of low-
income consumers who are high users of electricity.",72 With testi-
mony established, the court stated, that family size, and the home's size
and age "have a greater effect on electricity consumption than income
does."
73
In contrast to more traditional analysis, this Article examines not
the grant of special favors, but rather the imposition of illegitimate bur-
1982) ("The commission now finds that although a general lifeline rate structure will
benefit some low-income/low users, as intended, it will also have the undesirable result
of benefitting a substantial number of middle and/or high-income/low users, and harm-
ing a substantial number of low-income/high users."); Re Hawaiian Elec. Co., Inc., 43
Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 361, 384, 487 (1981); Re New England Tel. and Tel. Co., 84
Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 130 (Mass. 1970); Re Generic Hearings Concerning Elec.
Rate Structure, 36 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 6 (Colo. 1979).
68. E.g., Mountain States Legal Found., 636 P.2d at 1058. ("In addition, there are
others, not senior citizens, in similar economic conditions. However, the Commission
has not explained why it defined the class in the manner it did. It is arguable that the
classification is underbroad in that sense, but overbroad in the sense that not all senior
citizens have lower incomes or consume less energy than the average population.")
69. 450 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983).
70. 1d. at 102.
71. Id.
72. Id. Testimony established that 20% of families with income less than $7,500
had below average energy consumption, while 25% of families with income greater than
$25,000 had below average energy consumption. Id. at 103. A fallacy in this analysis,
however, is to define "low-income" simply by the dollar income level. Incomes that
otherwise look quite substantial, if used to support large families, will still leave the
household below the federal poverty level. A household's poverty status, as opposed to
its dollar income level, is a much truer measure of whether that household is "low-
income." t
73. Id. at 103. What the court does not address, however, is whether there is a
sufficiently strong correlation between poverty status and certain types of housing to
warrant use of income as a surrogate.
1990]
Washington University Open Scholarship
108 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 37:97
dens.74 These burdens may, for example, take the form of deposits,75
credit checks,7 6 late payment charges,7 7 or the like. A "burden" is de-
fined for purposes of this Article as an obligation which treats one cus-
tomer or class of customers less favorably than all other customers.78
Given this review of overt utility discrimination, it is necessary next
to turn to the more difficult situation; the instance where a practice is
neutral on its face79 but still has discriminatory impacts. Before pro-
posing a mechanism for assessing this more subtle discrimination in
utility practices, we turn to areas of the law where the evaluation of
claims of unintentional discrimination have become more routine. We
seek to learn from application of the "effects test" chiefly in employ-
ment law but also in housing and consumer credit law.
II. THE USE OF AN "EFFECTS TEST" IN THE NON-UTILITY
CONTEXT
The primary attribute of an "effects test" is the separation of the
results of a practice urged to be discriminatory from the intention of
the defending party. The "effects test" does not rely upon proof of the
challenged party's improper intent but rather upon the measurement of
disparate impacts.80 The defendant's good or bad faith is irrelevant to
any showing that a challenged practice does or does not discriminate
against a protected class.8" Instead, the focus is on discriminatory re-
74. Cf Re Rates for Motor Carriers, 39 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 167 (Or. PUC
1961) (rates subject a person or area to unreasonable prejudice).
75. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Bateman, 266 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Ark.
151) (deposit requirements).
76. See, e.g., Re Washington Gas Light Co., 82 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 225
(D.C.P.S.C. 1970) (credit categories).
77. See, e.g., State of Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. Council of New Orleans, 309 So. 2d
290, 295 (La. 1975) (late payment charge rules).
78. This definition is based upon the definition of "discrimination" in the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). According to the ECOA, to "discriminate against an
applicant" for credit means "to treat an applicant less favorably than other applicants."
12 C.F.R. § 202.2(n) Reg. B (1985).
79. For an excellent definition of "facially neutral," see, Note, Credit Scoring, supra
note 8, at 1451.
80. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 155 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (disregarding intent of actor).
81. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) ("Good intent or
absence of discriminatory purpose does not redeem employment procedure that are re-
lated to measuring job capability."); United States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1972) (discrimination prevented by Fair Housing Act); United States v. Hughes Memo-
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sults.8 2 The "effects test" is used to challenge a pattern or practice of
the defendant that results in discriminatory impacts on particular
classes.8 3
A. The Initial Showing
Employment litigation, which often involves allegations of dispro-
portionate racial impacts, provides an excellent model for assessing the
presence of discrimination. Here, the primary method for demonstrat-
ing a prohibited effect is statistical analysis.84 Discriminatory impacts
can be statistically established in one of three ways. First, as shown in
U.S. v. Georgia Power Company,85 a litigant can prove that minorities
as a class are excluded by the challenged practice at a substantially
higher rate than whites. Litigants use this test to show that a particu-
lar employment practice adversely affects minority populations as a
whole in a disproportionate way. In Georgia Power, for example, the
company's requirement that all employees have a high school diploma
rial Home, 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.Va. 1975) (no good faith defense to practices prohib-
ited by Fair Housing Act).
82. Note the difference between constitutional and statutory use of the effects test in
this regard. "The United States Supreme Court ... in 1976... proscrib[ed] the nonevi-
dentiary use of disparate impact in constitutional analysis. In so doing, the Court drew
a sharp distinction between the constitutional and statutory standards for measuring
discrimination." Hsia, supra note 8, at 787 (citations omitted). Hsia notes that "against
the restrictive constitutional backdrop, however, the statutory schemes requiring the
use of the effects test are increasing." Id., at 789-90.
83. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J.
1976) (sexual discrimination); Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D.Cal.
1976) (sexual discrimination). Cf Olsen v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976)
(promotion of qualified men over qualified women did not suffice to establish "discrimi-
natory impact" so as to make out prima facie case of sex discrimination).
84. Substantial writing has been done on the use of statistical evidence. Some arti-
cles simply review court cases relying on statistical evidence. See, ag., Note, Evidence:
Statistical Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 28 OKLA. L. REV. 885 (1975);
Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences under Title VI1, 59 VA. L.
REV. 463 (1973); Montlack, Using Statistical Evidence to Enforce the Laws Against Dis-
crimination, 22 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 259 (1973). Other articles review statistical meth-
ods. See, e.g., Dorsano, Statistical Evidence in Employment Discrimination Litigation:
Selection of the Available Population, Problems, and Proposals, 29 Sw. L.J. 859 (1975);
Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical
Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L. REV. 387 (1975); Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates
in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARV. L. REv. 793 (1978);
Bogen and Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. Rlv.
59 (1974).
85. 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
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was successfully challenged. "The requirement undoubtedly screens
out blacks at a considerably higher rate than whites," the court said.86
In the South, the court found, in the 25-44 age group, 64.7 percent of
white males, 35 percent of black males, 63 percent of white females,
and 34.7 percent of black females, had completed high school." Simi-
larly, in Griggs v. Duke Power,8 the class disproportionately lacked
the factor that would include class members among the employed.
A California decision represents the converse of the Griggs situation.
A company rule dismissing employees who had their wages garnished
was struck down in Johnson v. Pike Corporation of America. 9 The
court observed that "the proportion of racial minorities among the
group of people who have had their wages garnished is significantly
higher than the proportion of racial minorities in the general popula-
tion."90 Unlike Griggs, in Johnson, the class had a disproportionate
share of the attribute which excluded them from being among the em-
ployed. As can be seen, the first statistical test can be used in either of
two ways: it can examine an attribute that the affected class has, which
attribute serves as the basis for the discrimination. Second, it can scru-
tinize an attribute that the affected class lacks, which attribute serves as
the basis for the discrimination.
Under either use of the first statistical test, it does not matter
whether there is an actual demonstrated impact upon particular em-
ployee/applicants. If the practice can be shown to have a dispropor-
tionate impact on the minority population as a whole, even without
considering the specific applicants, a prima facie case of discrimination
has been made. An attribute that results in discrimination can be
either inclusive (all members possessing a certain characteristic are dis-
qualified) or exclusive (all members lacking a certain characteristic are
disqualified).
In contrast, the second statistical test specifically examines the em-
ployee population. Using this test in Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v.
86. Id. at 918.
87. Id. Similar figures were found for Atlanta in particular: "Statistics show that
for males over 18 years of age, 70.7% of the whites finished high school compared with
only 46.2% of blacks." Id
88. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
89. 332 F. Supp. 490, 492-497 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
90. Ide at 494. See also Gregory v. Litton Systems, 316 F. Supp. 401,403 (C.D. Cal.
1970). Employment based on arrests is discriminatory. While blacks nationally com-
prise 1 I% of the population, blacks account for 27% of reported arrests, and 45% of
arrests based simply on suspicion. Id.
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Bridgeport Civil Service Commission,9 1 the court held that a prima facie
case of discrimination was established by comparing the number of mi-
nority and white job applicants actually excluded by the challenged
practice. In Bridgeport Guardians, the court examined the results of a
written examination administered over five years by a police depart-
ment.92 The court found a prima facie case of discrimination estab-
lished, noting that "the passing rate for whites was 3 1/2 times better
than Blacks and Puerto Ricans."9 3 A similar challenge was brought
against the New York fire department.9 4 The "basic facts" that the
court found persuasive established that:
Roughly 11.5% of the 14,168 applicants who entered the exami-
nation halls were black or Hispanic. Yet minority members com-
prised only 5.6% of those who had passed the written, physical
and medical examinations at the time of the hearing. Non-minor-
ity candidates thus survived the screening process at a rate more
than twice that of minority candidates.9 5
The court disapproved this discrimination, as shown by the disparate
impact upon the specific individuals involved, rather than upon the mi-
nority population as a whole.
9 6
Finally, discrimination can be demonstrated by comparing the level
of inclusion of minorities by the company as compared to the percent-
age of minorities in the relevant geographical area. In Rodriguez v.
East Texas Motor Freight,9 7 for example, the court noted that at the
time of the complaint, the company had never hired a black or His-
panic line driver98 in Texas.9 9 By the time of the trial, the company
had hired three Mexican-Americans but no blacks for its 180-member
91. 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973).
92. Id. at 1335.
93. Id. 58% of the 568 whites who took the exam passed while only 17% of the 76
Blacks and Hispanics passed. See also, Rogers v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d
1340, 1348-49 (8th Cir. 1975) (statistical evidence sufficient to show racially disparate
impact of a skilled crafts testing program).
94. Vulcan Soc'y. of N.Y. City Fire Dept. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 490 F.2d 367 (2d
Cir. 1973).
95. Id. at 392.
96. Id. at 392-93.
97. 505 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1974) vacated, 431 U.S. 395 (remanded after determina-
tion that plaintiffs failed to represent class).
98. "Line drivers," as opposed to lower paid "city, pick-up and delivery drivers"
were considered the more prestigious jobs at the company. Id. at 46.
99. Id. at 48, 54.
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driver force."°° The court found that the company had failed to prove
that "the relevant labor pool lack[ed] qualified minority persons."' '
In the Bridgeport case, the court relied upon the third test also, in
finding discrimination in its police hiring case. In Bridgeport, the Sec-
ond Circuit observed that "while Bridgeport has a combined Black and
Spanish speaking population of 25 percent, members of these minori-
ties only represent 3.6 percent of the Department."' 2
This final test, however, can be used to disprove, as well as to prove,
a discriminatory effect. In Butts v. Nichols,"°3 plaintiffs challenged the
employment practices of the Des Moines police department.' 4 Des
Moines had adopted an ordinance prohibiting the city from employing
convicted felons."0 5 Plaintiffs argued that since the percentage of the
black population in Iowa prisons exceeded the percentage of the black
population in Des Moines, any ordinance which discriminated against
convicted felons also discriminated on the basis of race.' 0 6 This argu-
ment would seem to fall directly within the reasoning of Georgia Power
and Pike Corporation. The Iowa court, however, rejected that conten-
tion. The court stated: "Although there are several departments in the
city which have a low percentage of black employees, the overall per-
centage of black city employees (7.1 percent) is greater than the per-
centage of black population in Des Moines (5.62 percent)."'0 7
In sum, any one of three statistical approaches can be used to estab-
lish a prima facie case of discrimination in employment litigation. One
can show discrimination by comparing the percentage of the class dis-
criminated against in the total population to the percentage in the pop-
ulation subject to the challenged practice. One can show that the
challenged practice excludes the protected class at an inappropriately
disparate rate.10 8 One can show a disproportionate representation of
the protected class in the population limited by the challenged prac-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 48, 54.
102. 482 F.2d at 1335.
103. 381 F. Supp. 573 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
104. Id. at 574.
105. Id. at 574-75.
106. Id. at 578.
107. Id. at 579. Cf. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 910 (5th Cir.
1973).
108. For example, one must meet a designated credit criteria. However, hypotheti-
cally, while 50 percent of all whites meet that criteria, only five percent of Blacks do.
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tice. 109 As shown below, these three approaches are also easily adapta-
ble to the utility context.
B. The Justification
Even where disparate impacts can be shown, the mere presence of
such impacts is often not sufficient to disapprove of a challenged prac-
tice. 1 ° Discriminatory impacts in employment proceedings, 1 ' for ex-
ample, can be justified by a showing that the employment practice is a
"business necessity." 11 2 In general, to show a business necessity, an
employer must show a significant correlation between the employment
practice and "important elements of work behavior which comprise or
are relevant to the job." '13
In addition to examining what is a business necessity, however, one
must consider what is not.1 4 Perhaps most importantly, mere busi-
ness convenience has been found to be not a sufficiently compelling
"necessity" to override discriminatory impacts.1 15 Economic burdens
must rise to the level of making alternatives to the discriminatory prac-
109. For example, while the population of Whiteacre is 40 percent Black, only five
percent of the Whiteacre fire department is Black.
110. See, e.g., 490 F.2d at 393. The Second Circuit correctly noted that the dispa-
rate impact "does not at all decide the case" but merely places a "burden of justifica-
tion" on the purveyor of the challenged practice. Id.; Bridgeport, 482 F.2d at 1335 n.4.
The court observed that some courts have held that while a mere discrepancy between a
minority population and an employment population may not of itself establish a prima
facie case of discrimination, "it does invite inquiry." Id Other courts have held that a
substantial discrepancy is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Id. (citations
omitted).
11. Due to the disparate fact patterns presented in Title VIII fair housing cases, no
uniform analytic framework involving a "necessity" defense can be found.
112. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 430, 431 (1971).
113. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(c)).
114. See generally Note, Business Necessity Under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
115. See, eg., Watkins v. Scott Paper, 530 F.2d 1159, 1181 (5th Cir.); cert. denied,
429 U.S. 861 (1976) (where employer has some other option); see also Robinson v.
L6rillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971)
("While considerations of economy and efficiency will often be relevant to determining
the existence of business necessity, dollar cost alone is not determinative."); Johnson v.
Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (employers inconven-
ience, annoyance or even expense are not sufficient justifications standing alone for dis-
crimination). See generally Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 587-95 (1979).
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tice infeasible. Overall, most cases indicate that a challenged employ-
ment practice must satisfy three criteria to fall within the business
necessity exemption. First, the practice must relate to a valid business
purpose which is sufficiently compelling to override any discriminatory
impacts. Second, it must effectively carry out the purpose for which it
is said to serve. Finally, there must be no less discriminatory alterna-
tive that will carry out that purpose as effectively. 116
In sum, under specific federal statutory authority, discrimination in
employment, housing and credit is prohibited. Under these statutes,
discrimination can be demonstrated using an "effects test." The effects
test holds that the good faith of the person engaging in the challenged
practice is irrelevant; if the practice results in discrimination, it is un-
lawful. Litigation brought pursuant to this legislation generally in-
volves a three-step process. First, the litigant must establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing the presence of disparate im-
pacts. Second, the person undertaking the challenged practice may
seek to justify the practice, notwithstanding the discriminatory impact,
on the grounds that it serves an essential business need. Finally, the
litigant may seek to show that any essential business need that may
exist can be met by alternative means in a less discriminatory manner.
In light of this framework, it is possible to determine whether a similar
analysis can be applied in a utility setting.
III. DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC UTILITIES: A MODEL
The proscription on discriminatory practices by public utilities
should be applied as strictly to service regulation as it is to rate regula-
tion. 117 The fundamental "rule" as set forth not only by the common
law'1 8 but by statute 9 requires a utility to serve on reasonable terms
all those who desire the service it renders. "[T]he public utility is
under a legal obligation to render adequate and reasonably efficient ser-
vice impartially, without unjust discrimination, and at reasonable
116. Comment, Title VII, supra note 8, at 175-76, 177-185 (1979).
117. "Discrimination in public utility service is governed by the same principles as
those discussed in connection with discrimination in rates." Nichols, supra note 5, at
1021-1041.
118. 64 AM. JUR. 2d, Public Utilities, § 16 n.51 (1972) (citations omitted).
119. See, Comment, Liability of Public Utility for Temporary Interruption of Service,
1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 344, 345-46 n.9 (1974); see also, Lake, Discrimination by Railroads
and Other Public Utilities -Preferences to Patrons in a Given Locality, 25 N.C.L. REV.
273 (1947) (as applied to the Interstate Commerce Act).
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rates."120 A utility must make its service available to all members of
the public to whom its public use and scope of operation extend, who
apply for such service, and who comply with its reasonable rules and
regulations. 121
This section proposes a model to use in enforcing this obligation for
service regulations by pursuing a claim of de facto violation of the pro-
scription against discrimination. The model is based upon the same
substantive principles outlined for assessing rate discrimination. 122 It
uses a process similar to that used in employment litigation. 123
A. The Substantive Foundation: Applying the Ratemaking Principles
The same principles that are used to evaluate claims of discrimina-
tion in ratemaking should be used to evaluate claims of service discrim-
ination as well. Four such principles stand out. First, a utility may not
rely on a social policy ground unrelated to the provision of utility ser-
vice to justify its service policy. 124 However socially beneficial or justi-
fied the policy may be, 25 if there is no utility-related basis for the
practice, the policy may not serve to justify a service practice. Second,
even when a utility justification is proffered, there must be a rational
relationship between the practice and the asserted basis. This relation-
ship must be clearly demonstrated, not assumed. 126 Third, if a prac-
120. Birmingham v. Rice Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 26 N.W.2d 39 (Iowa 1947) (citing 43
AM. JUR. 586). Cf Overman v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 675 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Mo.
App. 1984) ("A public utility is obligated by the nature of its business to furnish a
service or commodity to the general public which it has undertaken to serve, without
arbitrary discrimination.... Such duties arise from the public nature of a utility, and
statutes providing affirmatively therefore are merely declaratory of the common law."
Id. (citing 73B C.J.S., Public Utilities § 8).
121. See, eg., Josephson v. Mountain Bell Tel. Co., 576 P.2d 850, 852 (Utah 1978)
(utility must render service to all members of the public who so request and pay for it);
See also 26 AM. JUR.2D, Electricity, Gas and Steam, § 110 (1966) (duty with respect to a
delay in commencing electric service); 26 AM. JUR.2D, Electricity, Gas and Steam,
§ 216 (1966) (delay in commencing gas service).
122. See supra notes 39-73 and accompanying text.
123. See supra, notes 80-117 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 48-51 and 65-66 and accompanying text.
125. For example, Philadelphia Gas Works recently justified its policy of denying
service to applicants who could not prove they were either tenants or homeowners on
the grounds that the utility should not contribute to the unlawful and non-consensual
occupation of property.
126. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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tice is over- or under-inclusive in nature, it should be disapproved. 127
A practice may not exclude those to which it should apply nor may it
include those to which it should not apply. Finally, the foundation of
any claim of discrimination is that all persons similarly situated must
be treated alike.12 If households that have no discernible differences
are receiving disparate service treatment or if households with different
characteristics are receiving identical treatment, a claim of discrimina-
tion should lie.
B. The Procedural Foundation: Applying the Effects Test Principles
A utility discrimination model fits neatly into the effects test frame-
work developed for employment, housing and credit discrimination. A
three-step process is warranted.
First, a complainant must establish a prima facie case that a discrete
class of customers is being unreasonably affected by a utility's practice.
This step has two components. Initially, there must be a disparate im-
pact on a discrete class of customers. Three different statistical meth-
ods exist to establish such an impact. 29 Where the utility model
diverges, however, is in the need to establish further that the impact on
the discrete class is "unreasonable." Unlike the "protected classes" set
forth in the employment, 3° housing, 3' and credit 132 statutes, no par-
ticular group of utility customers is entitled to special protection in
utility law.' 33 Nevertheless, subjecting one class of customers to an
unnecessary and disproportionate exposure to the disconnection of ser-
vice' would rise to the level of "unreasonable" discrimination.135
127. See supra note 67-73 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
130. Title VII prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
131. Title VIII prohibits discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex or na-
tional origin. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (1982).
132. The ECOA prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, national
origin, sex, marital status, age, income based in whole or part on public assistance, and
the good faith exercise of rights under the federal Consumer Protection Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1691(a) (1982).
133. In this regard, the utility statutes should be viewed more as a consumer protec-
tion statute than as a civil rights statute. Compare early discussions regarding the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act for the significance of this distinction. See, e.g.,
Lyckman, The 1978 Amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 28 BAYLOR L.
REv. 633 (1976).
134. The decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971) can be
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Moreover, if a customer class is adversely affected for reasons demon-
strably unrelated to the utility purpose sought to be served by a prac-
tice, the practice producing such an effect should be found to be
unreasonable. 1 3
6
If a disparate impact is proven, the second step of the three-step pro-
cess would permit a utility to justify its practice on the grounds that the
practice has a manifest relationship to a legitimate business purpose.
137
Thus, for example, a discounted rate might be supported by evidence
that it is the only way to meet competition from fuel-switching, 138 a
particular disconnect or deposit practice might be justified on the
grounds that it is the only way to reduce bad debt. 139 Similarly, a late
payment charge may be argued to be the only way to ensure prompt
constructively consulted for determining when the exposure is "unnecessary and dispro-
portionate." In Griggs, the court found three objectionable features: (1) that the criteria
were over-broad and general, Id. at 433; (2) that the criteria were based on attributes
that minorities had no opportunity to acquire Id at 430; and (3) that minorities had no
means to manifest the attribute fairly. Id. at 430.
135. Indeed, any violation of a utility's duty to'serve would be "unreasonable" ac-
tion on its part. For a survey of what actions violate a utility's duty to serve, see gener-
ally Colton, Regulating the Unregulated Utility: Customer Service Regulations for Rural
Electric Cooperatives, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER (July 1989); see also Note,
Public Utilities and the Poor: The Requirement of Cash Deposits from Domestic Consum-
ers, 78 YALE L.J. 448 (1969).
136. Those regulations universally held unreasonable include disconnecting service
for a collateral matter. Annotation, Right of Public Utility Corporation to Refuse its
Service Because of Collateral Matter Not Related to that Service, 55 A.L.R. 771 (1928);
disconnecting for nonpayment of a third party's debt. Annotation, Liability of Prem-
ises, or Their Owner or Occupant, for Electricity, Gas, or Water Charges, Irrespective of
Who is the User, 19 A.L.R.3d 1227 (1968); disconnecting service for nonpayment of an
unrelated service, Annotation, Right of Municipality to Refuse Services Provided by It to
Resident for Failure of Resident to Pay For Other Unrelated Services, 60 A.L.R.3d 714
(1974).
137. Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of proof would switch
to the utility to justify its practice on non-discriminatory grounds. International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359 n.45 (1977). See also, Albermarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). When each step is met, the burden
switches to the other party. E.g., Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539 F.2d 77 (5th
Cir. 1977); Senter v. General Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1976); United Trans.
Union Local 974 v. Norfolk and W. Ry., 532 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1975).
138. See, eg., Re Honolulu Gas Co., 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 307 (Haw.
P.U.C. 1970) (application to adjust rates); Watkins v. Atlantic City Elee. Co., 67 Pub.
Util. Rep. 3d 483 (N.J. D.P.U. 1967) (argument challenged). But see, Idaho Pub. Util.
Comm'n v. Intermountain Gas Co., 73 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 209 (Idaho P.U.C.
1968) Re Iowa Power and Light Co., 63 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 367 (ISCC 1984).
139. E.g. Re Washington Gas Light Company, 82 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 225
(D.C. P.S.C. 1970).
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payment."4 As with employment cases, however, strict limits must be
placed on this defense. A utility should not be permitted to assert sim-
ply that its otherwise discriminatory practice is effective; it must in-
stead show that the practice is essential.14 1 Moreover, the fact that
other alternatives might be more expensive should not be a permissible
defense, unless the expense is so great as to render less discriminatory
alternatives infeasible.
14 2
The third step in the three-step process is to permit a rebuttal to a
proffered utility "business" justification. This rebuttal would show
that less discriminatory means are available to accomplish the utility
function serving as the basis for the justification. Thus, in a shutoff
situation, for example, if a more precise measure of credit-worthiness
can be proven, the use of a measure with demonstrably discriminatory
impacts should be disapproved.
143
This line of reasoning can be identified in some past ratemaking situ-
ations. To begin, the premise is that rates must be non-discrimina-
tory. I" At times, however, diversions from this rule are permitted.
Discounts have been approved, particularly when necessary to preserve
industrial load.145 The reason for the discount is to serve a utility func-
tion: to protect the utility load from competition. 46 These decisions
reason that so long as the discounted rate covers the industrial cus-
tomer's variable costs of production, 4 7 any additional money paid will
140. E.g., Jones v. Kansas Gas and Elec. Co., 222 Kan. 390, 565 P.2d 597 (Kan.
1977).
141. See Note, supra note 116. See also United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446
F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) ("The 'business necessity' doctrine must mean more than
that transfer and seniority policies serve legitimate management functions ...
[Niecessity connotes an irresistible demand. To be preserved, the seniority and transfer
system must not only directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also be essential
to those goals.").
142. See supra notes 116-117 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
144. See supra 13-15 and accompanying text.
145. E.g., Detroit Edison Company, 68 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 241 (Mich. P.S.C. 1985)
(increase granted); Re Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR)
120 (Ind. P.S.C. 1986) (increase granted). But see Ex parte United Gas Pipe Line Co.,
42 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 120 (La. P.S.C. 1961) (future escalation not authorized).
146. E.g., Re Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 22 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 209 (Cal.
P.U.C. 1958).
147. For a discussion of the theory of designing a rate sufficient to recoup the varia-
ble costs of production, see generally P. GARFIELD AND W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS 138-140 (1964).
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contribute to the system's fixed costs and thus leave remaining ratepay-
ers better off than had the customer left the system entirely.148 The
additional requirement that the discount be narrowly drawn has been
imposed, however, where this type of discount rate has been
approved. 149
In these cases, each of the three lines of analysis can be identified: (1)
Is there a discriminatory effect? Yes, there is a rate difference. (2) If
so, is it supported by a business necessity? Yes, because there is a need
to meet competition. (3) If so, is there a less discriminatory alterna-
tive? No, if the rate is drawn sufficiently narrow.
IV. DE FACTO DISCRIMINATION BY PUBLIC UTILITIES
A. Illustrations
De facto discrimination against low-income households can occur in
a variety of contexts when public utility actions are judged by an "ef-
fects test." Examples discussed below include discrimination in credit
and collection techniques by Michigan Bell, discrimination in the offer
of payment plans by Central Maine Power Company, and discrimina-
tion in the offer of energy conservation programs by Western Massa-
chusetts Electric Company. In none of these instances did the utility
seek to implement programs that were overtly discriminatory against
low-income households. Nevertheless, the activities do indeed discrim-
inate against those with low income because of program attributes that
are unrelated to any compelling need of the utility. Each practice will
be examined separately below. 50
1. Credit and Collection Techniques
Michigan Bell Telephone Company (Michigan Bell) has a classifica-
tion scheme for credit and collection purposes that unfairly discrimi-
nates against the poor. 5 Michigan Bell's system of "Account
148. E.g., Re Portland Gen. Elec. Co., 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 463 (Or.
P.U.C. 1987); Re Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., 78 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 128
(Ind. P.S.C. 1986).
149. E.g., Re Portland Gen. EIec. Co., 86 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 463 (Or.
P.U.C. 1987) (discount must be no lower than necessary to retain load).
150. It is less important, with these illustrations, to conclude that discrimination
has in fact occurred than it is to understand the underlying rationale.
151. National Consumer Law Center, Telephone Customer Service Regulations in
the Post-Divestiture Environment. A Study Of Michigan Bell Telephone Company, at 68 -
101 (July 1988).
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Groups" is at the center of the scheme. Michigan Bell classifies a cus-
tomer for credit and collection purposes based solely upon the length
of time the customer has had service in his or her own name.152 Three
Account Groups are based upon this "length of service" criterion. Ac-
count Group 1 (AG1) includes households which have had service for
zero to 12 months; Account Group 2 (AG2) covers households who
have had service for 13 to 24 months; Account Group 3 (AG3) covers
households with service for more than 24 months. 53 Michigan Bell
emphasizes that the only events that will "programmatically change a
customer's account group number" are length of service and the exist-
ence of a suspension for nonpayment. 154 The Account Group classifi-
cation is based on the verified length of previous telephone service with
any Bell or independent telephone company. 55
This classification of a customer is the factor upon which a number
of credit and collection decisions and actions by Michigan Bell are
based. For example, deposits will be collected only from an AG1
household; AG2 and AG3 households have a blanket exemption from
deposit requirements as a matter of Michigan Bell policy.'56 Thus, for
example, if a customer is found to have a delinquent account with a
different Michigan utility, a deposit may be collected only if that cus-
tomer is an AG1 household. Similarly, AG1 households are subjected
to stricter collection techniques. For example, an AG1 household will
be sent a shutoff notice when its outstanding arrears is one-half of its
average bill.' 57 In contrast, AG2 and AG3 households receive only
"reminders" in such a situation. 5 ' In effect, both AG2 and AG3
households are permitted to "carry" an arrears greater than a house-
hold identical in all respects but for its length of service.
152. The customer also may use the name of his or her spouse. Id., at 69.
153. A fourth Account Group includes all households who have had service discon-
nected within the immediately preceding 12 month period, regardless of the length of
service. Id at 68.
154. Id. at 68-69.
155. Id. at 69. This includes service shared with a spouse or former spouse.
156. Id. at 70-71.
157. The arrears must also exceed $25. Thus, if a bill is either less than $25 or less
than half of the customer's average monthly bill, no shutoff notice will be sent. Id. at
72-76.
158. An AG2 household will receive a shutoff notice only if the household's arrears
is equal to $45 or the household's average monthly bill, whichever is higher. An AG3
household receives a shutoff notice if the arrears is twice the average bill or $45, which-
ever is higher. Id at 75.
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The Michigan Bell credit scheme is a utility example of the use of the
type of "unscored objective criteria" frequently found objectionable in
employment discrimination litigation.'5 9 The Michigan Bell scheme
labels, based upon a single characteristic, a certain population as "less
creditworthy." Michigan Bell has decided that households who have
had service for fewer than 12 months present credit risks to the Com-
pany. What Michigan Bell has failed to acknowledge, however, is the
converse: that while more risky households might have had service for
fewer than 12 months, not all households who have had service for that
period of time would constitute a risk to the company.' 6 °
The differences between the Bell scheme and the employment cases
are minor. In Gregory v. Litton Systems,' 6 ' for example, the presence
of arrests for crimes other than a minor traffic offense precluded em-
ployment.' 62 In Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,163 the objectiona-
ble criterion was the presence of a conviction for a crime other than a
minor traffic offense. 164 In Griggs v. Duke Power Company,165 a re-
quirement for a high school diploma was challenged. 16 6 In Johnson v.
Pike Corporation,167 at issue was the garnishment of wages.' 6 1 In each
case, a single attribute of the class was used to measure a broad factor:
fitness for employment. In no case was there an allegation of any im-
proper intention by the employer in establishing the classification
scheme. In Gregory, for example, the court expressly found that Lit-
ton's policy of disqualifying frequently arrested persons was "objec-
tively applied and was enforced without reference to race, color,
religion, sex or national origin."'169 Nevertheless, racial discrimination
was present. The court found "this discrimination exists even though
such a policy is objectively and fairly applied as between applicants of
159. E.g., Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); Gregory v.
Litton Sys. Inc., 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970), aff'd, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972);
Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
160. Michigan Bell, supra note 152, at 96-98.
161. 316 F. Supp. 401 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
162. Id. at 402.
163. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
164. Id. at 1293.
165. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
166. Id. at 431.
167. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
168. Id. at 492.
169. Gregory, 316 F.Supp. at 402.
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various races." 1
70
Applying the principles of the effects test to the Michigan Bell
scheme can be constructively compared to the District of Columbia
Public Service Commission's decision in Re Washington Gas Light
Company.17 1 In that case, the D.C. commission considered the credit
and deposit policies of a gas company. The commission held that while
it was reasonable to create categorical exemptions from deposit re-
quirements, the converse practice - to categorically require deposits
from all customers not falling in an exempt class - was unreasona-
ble. 72 In language closely paralleling that used in the consumer credit,
housing and employment contexts, the commission held that custom-
ers should be required to post a deposit "only on the basis of specific
information relating to their own credit reliability."' 173
In assessing the use of population characteristics such as that used
by Michigan Bell, the inquiry would regard whether there is "inade-
quate prediction."" If the utility, in effect, assigns negative value to
attributes possessed in high proportion by groups which are protected,
regardless of the actual correlation between those attributes and the
behavior actually sought to be measured, the criterion is objectiona-
ble.' At the least, a criterion may not be overbroad and general. It
must permit the protected group to manifest the desired characteristic
sought by the Utility. 176 As one commentator summarized the legal
requirements for consumer credit: "Screening must allow individuals
who would perform equally well an equal chance to signal their ex-
pected performance."' 177 A "sweeping disqualification" of all persons
170. Id. at 403.
171. 82 Pub. Util. Rep. 3d (PUR) 225 (D.C. P.S.C. 1970).
172. Id. at 227. "If a customer does not fail into an exempt category, the company
has a duty to make such inquiry as is necessary to determine the credit of that customer.
It cannot say that the customer does not fit into an exempt category and he must there-
fore pay a deposit." Id., at 228.
173. Id. The Commission also stated: "[W]e remain convinced that the decision to
require a deposit should be based on considerations directly relating to the credit relia-
bility of the customer involved." Id.
174. Note, Credit Scoring, supra note 8, at 1456. "It is not the overall accuracy of a
scoring system compared with other procedures that is at issue.... The issue here is
the legitimacy of using systems that may be expected to systematically predict a lower
proportion of successes for previously disadvantaged groups than for historically ad-
vantaged groups." Id. at 1456 n.30.
175. Id. at 1458.
176. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430, 433 (1971).
177. Note Credit Scoring, supra note 8, at 1474. With Michigan Bell, for example,
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with a particular attribute, rather than "a precise measurement" of the
desired attribute, is likely to be disapproved in a consumer credit con-
text, 178 and should be disapproved in the utility context as well.
In short, Michigan Bell's Account Group process does not allow
households who would perform equally well an equal chance to signal
their expected performance. The Account Groups result in a sweeping
disqualification of all persons with a particular attribute (length of ser-
vice) rather than resulting in a precise measurement of the desired at-
tribute of timely payment.
2. Winter Disconnections
The State of Maine has adopted a unique approach to the winter
payment problems of low-income customers. Rather than adopting a
"pure" winter moratorium, whereby disconnections of service are ab-
solutely prohibited for income-eligible customers from November
through April, 1 79 Maine has adopted a two-pronged approach to win-
ter shutoffs. The first prong requires utilities to make a reasonable ef-
fort to make personal contact with customers who are $50 or more in
arrears. 80 "Personal contact" may occur either by telephone or by a
premise visit." 1 The second prong is a system of payment plans. The
commission requires most utilities182 to offer eligible customers183 an
opportunity to enter into a Special Payment Arrangement. Under this
plan, a customer may pay less than the full amount of winter bills as
they become due; the difference is then "made-up" in equal increments
paid during the non-heating months. 84 In the event that (1) no per-
96% of the households tagged with the "risky" label because of their length of service
presented no danger of creating uncollectible accounts on the Bell system. Michigan
Bell, supra note 152, at 96.
178. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973) (applying
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424).
179. See National Consumer Law Center, Model Residential Utility Service Regu-
lations, 51(1984).
180. Chapter 81, § 17.D and § 17.A.2, P.U.C. Rules.
181. Chapter 81, § 17.B.9, P.U.C. Rules.
182. Utilities with fewer than 10,000 residential customers are exempt. Chapter 81,
§ 18.0, P.U.C. Rules.
183. An "eligible customer" is defined to be a customer who "is not able to pay for
utility service in accordance with the terms of the bill without exposing the customer or
other members of the customer's household to the probability of deprivation of food or
other necessities for health or life." Chapter 81, § 17.A.5, P.U.C. Rules.
184. Chapter 81, § 17.A.4, P.U.C. Rules.
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sonal contact is made with the customer, or (2) personal contact is
made and the customer and utility fail to agree on a payment plan, or
(3) a payment plan is agreed to but is subsequently broken, a utility
may seek to disconnect service even during the winter months so long
as it first seeks and obtains approval from the Maine Public Utility
Commission's (PUC) Consumer Assistance Division."s5
A recent report for the Maine PUC, prepared by the National Con-
sumer Law Center, found that these rules operated, however uninten-
tionally, to discriminate against a discrete population of low-income
households."8 6 The report found that 70 percent of the households for
whom a winter disconnection was sought,' 7 and 80 percent for whom
a winter disconnection was granted, "as lacked telephone service in their
home. The study found that the homes without telephones did not
have greater debt than the remaining population.' 8 9
The study found further that the structure of the utility's collection
procedures worked to exclude households lacking telephones. Accord-
ing to the study, a statistically significant difference existed in the
number of "no-phone households" that arranged to make full or par-
tial payments, that obtained public assistance, and that entered into
payment plans.190 The study concluded:
"It would appear that households which lack telephone service do
not have the same ability to undertake the basic activities neces-
sary to maintain home heating. They cannot contact social service
agencies for public assistance; nor can they contact their utility to
make payment plan arrangements."' 91
Based upon this analysis, the Maine PUC was urged to eliminate the
source of discrimination: heavy reliance upon telephone collection
techniques.
185. Chapter 81, § 17.1.2, P.U.C. Rules.
186, National Consumer Law Center, An Evaluation of Low-Income Utility Protec-
tions in Maine: Winter Requests for Disconnect Permission, at 16-18 (July 1988).
187. Id. at 16.
188. Id. at 19.
189. Indeed, exactly the opposite was found. On average, the population without
phones had $158 in arrears at the time of the original disconnect notice issued by the
utility while the population as a whole had $170 in arrears. Similarly, at the time the
utility sought permission to disconnect in the winter, the average in arrears for the "no-
phone" population was $189 while the average in arrears for the total population was
$210. Id. at 17.
190. Id. at 18.
191. Id.
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The Maine situation is an excellent. example of establishing uninten-
tional discrimination. The Maine utility had, in effect, made the pres-
ence of a telephone a prerequisite to maintaining energy service. Using
the first statistical test for establishing discrimination,19 2 it can then be
found that while on average less than one percent of all households
lack phone service, roughly 30 percent of all low-income households
lack telephone service. 193 The second of the three statistical methods
was used as well.' 94 As the employment tests in New York' 95 and
Bridgeport 9 6 disproportionately excluded minorities, so, too, did the
de facto requirement of a telephone disproportionately exclude low-
income Maine electric customers from continuing service.
Maine would be well-served to apply to its utility practices the em-
ployment practices counsel of the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Company.'97 What is required, the Court said, "is the removal
of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers."' 98 The Court contin-
ued to state that the "absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
. . . procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups."' 99
3. Energy Conservation Measures
The Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities (DPU) has in re-
cent years turned its attention to discrimination in electricity2°° con-
servation programs.2 ° Programs offered by utilities in Massachusetts,
the DPU found, unreasonably discriminated against the poor. The
DPU decided that exclusion of low-income households from receiving
192. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
193. G. Sterzinger, Telephone Ownership Since Divestiture, PuB. UTIL. FORT. at 25,
26 (Oct. 2, 1986).
194. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
195. Vulcan Soc'y of N.Y. City Fire Dep't. v. Civil Service Comm'n, 490 F.2d 367
(2d Cir. 1973).
196. Bridgeport Guardian v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d
Cir. 1973).
197. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
198. Id. at 431.
199. Id. at 432.
200. There is no need to limit the analysis to electric programs. The programs
which the DPU happened to be examining were electric. See infra note 202.
201. Re Western Mass. Elec. Co., 87 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306 (Mass. D.P.U.
1987) (rate determination proceeding).
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the "direct benefits" of conservation programs is "unacceptable."20 2
The seminal case is Re Western Massachusetts Electric Company,2 °0
in which the Hampshire Community Action Commission (HCAC), a
local community action agency, challenged both the overall conserva-
tion planning of Western Mass Electric Company (WMECO) and the
design of specific conservation programs. Both the planning and de-
sign components, HCAC argued, were marred by assumptions which,
though perhaps unwittingly, nevertheless resulted in the effect of ex-
cluding low-income households from conservation programs.2" This
exclusion, HCAC argued, not only denied an opportunity for the poor
to reduce their bills by reducing their consumption,2"5 but also resulted
in the poor paying the costs of the conservation measures while receiv-
ing none of the benefits.20 6
WMECO's energy conservation planning resulted in de facto dis-
crimination because of its failure to consider market barriers that were
unique to the poor. First, hurdle rates, an annual return on investment
required for a household to invest in conservation measures, were set at
levels that ignored low-income data.20 7 In its conservation planning,
WMECO assumed that any measure which met a hurdle rate of 30
percent would be implemented without financial assistance from the
utility.2°8 According to evidence presented by HCAC, however, low-
income hurdle rates reached up to 90 percent. Second, HCAC argued,
low-income households do not have access to investment capital for
conservation measures, even if those measures are recognized by cus-
tomers as providing economic benefits.20 9 If a household does not have
$400 to invest in a new appliance, in other words, it makes no differ-
ence that the new appliance would return a savings of $500 to the
202. Id. at 417.
203. 87 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306 (Mass. D.P.U. 1987). See also Re Cam-
bridge Elec. Light Co., DPU-87-221-A, 173 (Mass. D.P.U. 1988) (unpublished
opinion).
204. "Although WMECO asserts that its programs are designed to be income neu-
tral, HCAC contends that the effect of WMECO's programs, intended or unintended, is
to exclude low-income customers." Id at 404.
205. Id at 417.
206. Id at 405. "It is HCAC's position that the exclusivity of the Company's pro-
grams has two undesirable results. First, it excludes low-income customers from the
direct benefits of energy savings." Id.
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household. Finally, low-income persons may have less education,
which interferes with their ability to recognize the cost savings that
conservation measures might induce.21°
The Massachusetts DPU agreed that low-income customers of
WMECO "receive few of the direct benefits of energy savings made
available by Company-sponsored... programs." '211 Noting that low-
income customers are "systematically excluded from participation" in
Company conservation programs, using classic discrimination lan-
guage,2" 2 the DPU found that by its actions and inaction, the utility
"excludes a specific group of customers from enjoying the direct bene-
fits" of those programs.2" 3 The remedy, the DPU suggested, was for
the utility affirmatively to "take into account and compensate for mar-
ket failures that affect any customer group's participation" in the com-
pany's conservation programs.214  To eliminate the de facto
discrimination, the DPU concluded, "it is appropriate to use factors
such as range of income levels, customer rate classes, or levels of elec-
tricity use to target a program to a specific group." '21 5
In Re Eastern Edison Company216 the DPU also found Eastern
Edison to have a potential "bias in the selection process" for conserva-
tion programs.21 7 The DPU noted "the particularly limited scope of
programs" in finding that Eastern Edison was, through its planning
and implementation, effectively excluding "hard-to-reach residential
customers such as low-income customers and tenants., 21 8 In Eastern
Edison, the Department found the lack of information was a source of
discrimination. 219 According to the DPU, "a company must have an
adequate information base to determine the potential for [conservation]
210. Id.
211. Id. at 417.
212. See supra notes 52-55, 58-64, and accompanying text.
213. Western Mass., 87 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306 at 417.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 418.
216. 100 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 379 (Mass. D.P.U. 1988).
217. Id. at 418.
218. Id. The DPU found that, other than a hot water heater insulation program,
"the remaining programs target a very exclusive group of customers." Id.
219. Id., at 419. "Lack of information regarding the technical potential of [conser-
vation] in the territory could be an additional source of bias in the process. Finally, the
Company did not make any specific effort to consider the barriers to participating in
[conservation] programs by certain residential and low-income customers."
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within each customer class." '220 To meet the directive that each utility
must "take into account and compensate for market barriers that affect
any customer group's participation in Company [conservation] pro-
grams,"'22 each utility in Massachusetts must now engage in a "sys-
tematic analysis" and must "document ... consideration of program
designed to provide direct benefits to all customers including low-in-
come and other residential customers." '2 22
Elements of at least two of the three statistical tests for proving de
facto discrimination2 23 can be found in these conservation decisions.
The first factors found persuasive in demonstrating discrimination in
conservation planning and implementation look to the low-income
population as a whole, and not to particular households. The capital
availability factor, for example, is conceptually identical to the high
school diploma which the minority class lacked in Griggs.224 In imple-
menting conservation measures, WMECO made its programs available
only to customers who could afford to make a substantial financial con-
tribution on their own. This attribute, access to investment capital,
was entirely unrelated to the potential for conservation in any given
low-income home.22 5 Similarly, the exclusion of all measures that met
hurdle rates of greater than 30 percent was the same type of exclusion-
ary characteristic as the criminal conviction in Gregory22 6 or the wage
garnishment in Pike.227 Both the inclusive and exclusive aspects of the
first statistical test 228 were thus implicated in the WMECO proceeding.
Second, the exclusion of low-income households from particular
conservation programs in the WMECO case is an example of the sec-
ond statistical test. WMECO, for example, offered one comprehensive
conservation program to households "having a minimum annual usage
of 7,000 KWH. ' 229 HCAC noted that while the average consumption
220. Id. at 419.
221. Id (quoting Western Mass, 87 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306).
222. Id.
223. See supra notes 108-110 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
225. Another way to view this is that the requirement for a household to provide its
own investment capital did not permit the low-income household to demonstrate the
potential for cost-effective conservation in their homes. See supra notes 175-179 and
accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 162-63 and 170-71 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
229. Western Mass., 87 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th (PUR) 306, 405.
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of households with incomes greater than $15,000 was more than 7,000
KWH, "fewer than one in four households with incomes less than
$15,000 have annual consumption over 7,000 KWH." '23 Thus, the us-
age threshold, like the police testing procedures in New York 31 and
Connecticut 232 tended to exclude low-income households at a dispro-
portionate, and thus objectionable, rate.
B. Differences from the Past: Illustration
It is possible to take a prior utility discrimination case, lost by low-
income advocates, and determine whether a different result might have
been attained under the discrimination theory advanced in this Article.
In Jones v. Kansas Gas and Electric Company,233 low-income house-
holds challenged the utility's billing practices, arguing that those prac-
tices "discriminate against low-income families, older persons, welfare
recipients and persons on fixed incomes., 234 According to the plain-
tiffs, because the utilities use "cycle billing," coupled with a short pay-
ment period, "these persons are required to pay an excessive late
charge., 235 The households had asked the commission to, among
other things, allow customers to choose the date on which they were
billed.
2 3 6
The Kansas court rejected the discrimination challenge. The court
found that "there was no proof that the utilities intentionally designed
their billing to discriminate against low-income customers., 237 The
court held that its review was "limited to a determination of whether a
method is reasonable, not whether it is the most desirable of those pos-
sible.",23  Finally, the court found that "allowing consumers to choose
the date on which they were to be billed would increase operating
costs" to the utility.2 3 9
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
233. 569 P.2d 597 (Kan. 1977).
234. Id. at 604.
235. Id.
236. In this way, the billing date and the date on which various public benefit
checks (such as AFDC, social security and the like) could be made to more closely
coincide. Id.
237. Jones, 565 P.2d at 605.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 604.
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As is apparent from the discussions above, each of these Kansas de-
cisions would have been erroneous under the discrimination model
proposed based upon credit, housing and employment antecedents. 2 °
Under this model, absent constitutional claims,241 the fact that there
was no "intent" to discriminate is irrelevant. The focus is on the dis-
criminatory results.242 Under the proposed model, the court would
not have been limited to a determination of whether the single alterna-
tive could be supported. Rather, it would have a duty to determine if a
less discriminatory alternative existed.243 Finally, the fact that in-
creased costs may be associated with the less discriminatory alternative
would not be dispositive. Rather, the discriminatory alternative must
be the result of an "irresistible demand." 2" Assuming that the Kansas
litigants could have met one of the three statistical tests to make a
prima facie demonstration of discrimination, a question which cannot
be answered from the facts contained in the reported decision, the mer-
its of the case may well have been decided differently using the discrim-
ination model proposed herein.
CONCLUSION
Discrimination is discrimination whether it be intentional or de
facto. The federal government has taken specific actions in the past
two decades to enact legislation prohibiting discrimination in such pub-
lic areas as employment, housing and consumer credit. A body of law
has evolved around those statutes, holding that even discrimination
with no bad faith or discriminatory intent falls within their limits.
As in these other public areas, one of the basic tenets of utility law is
240. The litigants could have brought an ECOA challenge to the utility billing prac-
tices. The ECOA bans discrimination based on the receipt of public assistance, 15
U.S.C. § 1691(a) (2) (1982), and on age, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1) (1982). The ECOA
applies to a utility transaction. See Donaghue, The Equal Credit Opportunity Act and
Public Utilities, 105 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 28 (June 5, 1980). "Discrimination" has been
defined to mean to treat less favorably than other applicants, 12 C.F.R., § 202.2(n), a
definition which the imposition of a late payment charge seems clearly to meet. Thus, if
the utility billing practice was thought to be discriminatory, because it failed to account
for the dates on which public assistance and social security checks were received, thus
unfairly imposing late payment charges on customers, an ECOA complaint could have
been made out.
241. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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the ban on discriminatory actions. Born in the common law, this pro-
hibition has been universally codified in the various regulatory struc-
tures that oversee public utility operations. Unlike these other areas,
however, public utility law has been remiss in failing to address de
facto discrimination.
The argument that de facto discrimination exists can be applied in a
variety of ways to protect the interests of the poor in customer service
situations. It has been found that, even though lacking in malicious
intent, utilities often adopt procedures that have underlying assump-
tions that exclude the poor: the assumption of a telephone in the house-
hold, the assumption of adequate education, the assumption of access
to borrowed money. Using an effects test, claims of de facto discrimi-
nation may be a powerful tool to move reliance on these assumptions
from the realm of being "unfair" to the realm of being "unlawful."
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